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COMMENTS
Cartel in a Can: The Financial Collapse of
the International Tin Council
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the International Tin Council (the "ITC"), the operative
arm of the Sixth International Tin Agreement' (the "ITA 6"), collapsed
due to debt.2 Under the ITA 6 and earlier tin agreements, several sover-
eign states had joined together to form a tin cartel. This cartel, known as
the ITC, incurred this debt over time to fund its efforts to control the
supply and market price of tin. On October 24, 1985, however, the ITC
announced that it was unable to repay those debts or to fulfill its contrac-
tual obligations to purchase tin. When the creditors turned to the mem-
ber states of the cartel for payment, the member states refused to pay any
of the ITC's debts, which are estimated at £ 900,000,000.' In England,
I UNCTAD, Sixth International Tin Agreement, 1981, U.N. Doe. TD/TIN.6/14/Rev.1, U.N.
Sales No. E.82.II.D.16 [hereinafter ITA 6]. The ITC's powers to administer the agreement were
granted by Article 3(l). The twenty-three member countries of the ITA 6 are: Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United
Kingdom, Zaire, and the European Economic Community. Warbrick & Cheyne, The International
Tin Council, 36 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 931, n.1 (1987). Of these members, the producing nations are:
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, and Zaire. The consuming nations are: Canada,
Japan, India, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Spain, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
McFadden, The Collapse of Tin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity Agreement, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
811, 821 (1986) [hereinafter McFadden]. The United States was a member in the ITA 5 but declined
to join ITA 6. Wassermann, UNCTAD: Sixth International Tin Agreement, 15 J. WORLD TRADE
557, 558 (1981).
2 The ITC announced that it could no longer meet its financial obligations on October 24, 1985.
Bleiberg, Tin in a Box: One of the World's Oldest Cartels Has Come to Grief, BARRON'S, Nov. 18,
1985, at I1 [hereinafter Bleiberg]; Wagstyl, World Tin Market at the Brink, Fin. Times, Oct. 25,
1985, at 39, col. I [hereinafter Wagstyl].
3 Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, and Zaire had promised to contribute
£ 60,000,000 in cash if permitted by their governments, but the money was never paid. Wassermann,
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two of the ITC's creditors, Maclaine Watson & Co. and J.H. Rayner,
sued the ITC members for payment of the ITC's debts.4 These cases
were among the many cases emerging from the ITC crisis.5 Both were
unsuccessful in their first court actions.6 Because both cases raised simi-
lar issues of sovereign immunity, their direct actions against the ITC
members were consolidated in Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of
Trade & Industry7 upon appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of
Appeals, and subsequently the House of Lords, held that the members
were not liable on the debt.' These decisions condoned the ITC's behav-
ior despite the fact that an examination of the ITC's actions revealed a
history of "gross mismanagement."9
Sovereign states that are members of international commodity orga-
nizations must bear responsibility for the actions taken by their cartels.
Tin and Other Commodities in Crisis, 20 J. WORLD TRADE 232 (1986) [hereinafter Wassermann].
The creditors of the ITC, anxious to work out a method of payment, made several attempts to
involve the member states in a repayment plan.
Plans to refinance the ITC debts through "burden sharing" were numerous but generally unsuc-
cessful. The Graham Kestenbaum plan provided that the bankers, brokers, and ITC members
would invest £ 270,000,000 into the equity base of the ITC in order to create a new company, called
Newco, to take over the ITC stock and contracts.
Consumer member nations strongly resisted contributing new money to the ITC despite pres-
sure from Britain. Bartholomew, Slow Trade Planning, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Jan. 28, 1986, at
66. Indonesia and Thailand, the second and third largest producers, eventually refused to go along
with the final plan. Indonesia claimed that it was not at all responsible and saw no need to contrib-
ute. Indonesia felt that the continued production by non members would prevent any long term
solution. Bartholomew, All Chocks Are Away, FAR EAST. EcON. REV., Mar. 20, 1986, at 154.
Extensive debt settlement negotiations began again in 1989 as the ITC members tried to settle
claims pending in court. Gooding, ITC Members Meet on Debt Settlement, Fin. Times, Sept. 8,
1989, at 30, col. 1. Although one attempt succeeded, in the end no solution was formulated. Fur-
thermore, no country would contribute to the debts individually because of fears that payments
made without a judgment of liability might be construed as an admission of liability. See Prest, The
Collapse of the International Tin Agreement, 302 THE ROUND TABLE 170 (1987) [hereinafter Prest].
4 The ITC owed Maclaine Watson £ 6,000,000 and J.H. Rayner £ 16,000,000.
The English system of civil courts is a three-tiered hierarchy. Cases are first tried in the High
court. From there cases go to the Court of Appeal for appellate review before three judges. The
parties may petition for a final appellate hearing before the House of Lords, the "supreme tribunal."
This is to be distinguished from the Parliamentary House of Lords to which it was originally at-
tached. G. WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 5-9 (1982). Although the creditors were expected to
appeal the Maclaine Watson ruling to the House of Lords, the creditors and ITC members have
recently been involved in settlement negotiations. ITC Members Meet on Debt Settlement, Fin.
Times, Sept. 8, 1989 at 30, col. 1.
5 Thompson, The ITC Litigation, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 103, 107-110 (1988).
6 J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade & Indus., 1987 B.C.L.C. 667;
Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of Trade and Indus. 1987 B.C.L.C. 707.
7 Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of Trade & Indus., [1988] 3 All E.R. 257, 268.
8 Hughes, ITC Ruling Dashes Creditors' Hopes, Fin. Times, Oct. 27, 1989, at 40, col. 1 [herein-
after Hughes]; Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Department of Trade and Indus., [1988] 3 All E.R. at 268;
Maclaine Watson & Co. v. International Tin Council, [1989] 3 All E.R. 523.
9 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 268.
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Without the threat of legal action and punishment as a deterrent, mem-
ber states have little incentive to properly administer the international
trading organizations to which they belong. This Comment will first re-
view the factual background of the ITC and the court's decision in
Maclaine Watson. It will then discuss the charges that the ITC adminis-
tration was mismanaged. Lastly, it will analyze some legal bases that
support a decision imposing member state liability.
II. THE TIN CRisIs: A FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. International Commodity Agreements
An international commodity agreement ("ICA") is a program
designed and implemented by sovereign states that have a strong eco-
nomic interest in a particular commodity. The goal of an ICA is to sup-
port the commodity's price in the open market in order to yield profits
higher than those available in a competitive market. In order to main-
tain high prices, the cartel must limit available supply and consumers
must reject substitutes of the commodity.l° In the ITC situation, neither
of these requirements was met.
One way to limit supply and raise commodity prices is through the
use of a buffer stock. Cartels often build up the buffer stock of a com-
modity by withholding the commodity from the market when the market
price falls below the cartel's lowest acceptable price. By restricting sup-
ply, the cartel expects the price to rise. When the commodity's market
price exceeds the higher end of the acceptable price range, as predefined
by the cartel,"1 the cartel will sell off the buffer stock. Other ICAs use
buffer stocks to stabilize prices,12 and the international community has
supported the use of buffer stocks by ICAs.1 3
B. The Tin Agreements
The International Tin Agreement was established in 1953 to stabi-
lize the world tin market through artificial devices."4 Its member nations
10 R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 101 (1978).
11 Gilbert, International Commodity Agreements: Design and Performance, 15 WORLD DEV.
591, 592-94 (1987) [hereinafter Gilbert].
12 The International Cocoa Agreement and the International Natural Rubber Agreement both
employ buffer stocks. However, a buffer stock is not essential to an ICA. The International Coffee
Agreement and the International Sugar Agreement ensure price stability through export quotas on
their members. This way the cartel can control output. Id. at 591.
13 Macbean & Nguyen, International Commodity Agreements: Shadow and Substance, 15
WORLD DEv. 575 (1987) [hereinafter MacBean].
14 UNCTAD, Fifth International Tin Agreement 1975, U.N. Doc. TD/TIN.5/11 Art. 1; ITA 6,
supra note 1, Art. 1.
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both consumed and produced tin. 5 The ITC was created concurrently
as the administrative arm of the International Tin Agreement.16 Every
five years the members redrafted the agreement to accommodate mem-
bership and policy changes.17 Through the joint cooperation of tin con-
sumer nations and tin producer nations, the ITC was able to set a price
range that was acceptable to all the members and to support tin prices.
The price range was designed to satisfy consumers' demands for tin and
producers' desires for higher profits. The ITC used buffer stocks and
import quotas to control the world supply of tin. 8 That control allowed
the ITC to manipulate tin prices.
The ITA 6 provided for a "normal" buffer stock of 30,000 metric
tons of tin metal and an additional buffer stock of 20,000 metric tons, for
a total of 50,000 metric tons. 9 The ITC financed the "normal" 30,000
metric tons by requiring members to make financial contributions.20 It
financed the remaining 20,000 metric tons of the expanded buffer stock
by borrowing money. Lenders accepted actual tin stock as collateral.
Individual governments could also voluntarily undertake or guarantee
the loans by assuming full responsibility to pay in case the ITC
defaulted.21
C. The Problem of Supply
Despite its efforts to manage tin prices and supply, the ITC lost con-
trol of the world tin supply. The tin supply increased as new tin produ-
cers entered the market and rejected membership in the ITA.22 Because
these new producers were not subject to the ITC quotas, they were free
15 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 5(1).
16 UNCTAD, International Tin Agreement 1953, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.12/12, U.N. Sales No.
1954.II.D.4 [hereinafter ITA 1].
17 For example, in 1960 the ITA 1 was modified to institute "more flexible rules" for buffer stock
operation. G. SCHIAVONE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DICTIONARY AND DIRECTORY
169 (1983).
The previous International Tin Agreements are: ITA 1 (1956-1961), ITA 2 (1961-1966), ITA 3
(1966-1971), ITA 4 (1971-1976), and ITA 5 (1976-1981). K. KHAN, THE LAW AND ORGANIZA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS 189 (1982) [hereinafter KHAN]; see also 1
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1987-88.
18 ITA 6, supra note 1, Arts. 32-39. The buffer stock was probably a more important tool than
the export quotas. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 598.
19 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 21. A metric ton or "tonne" is defined as 1000 kilograms. Id. Art.
2.
20 Id. Art. 21. The responsibility for payment, shared equally between producing and consum-
ing nations, was met by an initial total member contribution in "the cash equivalent of 10,000 ton-
nes" and a later payment of 20,000 metric tons of tin metal. Id. Art. 22(l) & (2).
21 Id. Art. 21. No such guarantees supported any ITC loans during this period.
22 McFadden, supra note 1, at 824-26.
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to mine and to export as much tin as they wished.2" Thus, the ITC could
no longer control the available world supply of tin, and its carefully es-
tablished price structure weakened.24
Moreover, the ITC faced supply problems on other fronts. ITA
members as well as nonmembers ignored the ITC's supply restrictions.
Producing members who had agreed to restrict tin output evaded their
production quotas by smuggling tin out of their countries. In particular,
Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai mining companies smuggled tin into
Singapore.2 Additionally, a Malaysian mining company allegedly inde-
pendently attempted to manipulate the market to raise prices. As a re-
sult of this manipulation, the price of tin increased considerably, despite
the fact that demand was low and the supply was "plentiful."
26
ITA producers also competed with ITA consumer members. These
consumer members were not supposed to be net exporters, so they were
not subject to production quotas. Great Britain, for example, despite its
consumer status, managed to "cheat" on the tin cartel-by producing and
selling tin.27
Thus, although the ITC had originally controlled much of the
world's tin production, their market share had weakened considerably by
1985, the year of the collapse. One commentator estimated that the ITA
world output fell from 71% in 1981 to 57% by 1985.28 The high prices
created by the ITC efforts prompted nonmember tin producers such as
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, and Peru to enter the tin market indepen-
dently. Unfettered by production quotas and price levels, these maverick
producers increased the world tin supply and sold tin at lower prices
than ITA members could. The ITA "was essentially subsidizing the pro-
duction of nonmembers. ' '29
The ITA members tried to combat their falling market share by of-
23 Caught in a Tin Box, FAR EAST. EcoN. REv., Nov. 7, 1985, at 114 [hereinafter Caught In a
Tin Box].
24 Another important factor was the 1972 decision by the Council to use the Malaysian dollar as
the currency unit for the buffer stock. Because the Malaysian dollar was linked to the U.S. dollar
"for all practical purposes," when the U.S. dollar increased in value, the buffer stock manager was
able to acquire credit. When the dollar value fell in 1985, however, tin prices fell and the value of the
tin collateral fell with it. B. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS: A LEGAL
STUDY 200, 201 (1987) [hereinafter CHIMNI].
25 Chaikin, Organized Crime and Commodity Agreements, 3 Co. LAW. 176 (1982); Wagstyl, The
Crisis No One Is Ready to Resolve, Fin. Times, Nov. 1, 1985, at 22, col. 3.
26 Chaikin, Evidence of Market Manipulation in Tin Has Emerged, 3 Co. LAW. 27 (1982). The
prices increased from £ 6480 per metric ton to over £ 8000 per metric ton.
27 CHIMNI, supra note 24, at 200; The Tin Cartel is Making a Scrap Heap of the Market, Bus.
WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 38.
28 McFadden, supra note 1, at 825.
29 Id.
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fering membership to independent producers. For example, at the 1980
ITA drafting conference, a production quota of 1.23 %30 was suggested
as an allocation for Brazilian tin production. Brazil, however, rejected
the offer and remained independent. In the years after the conference,
Brazil's production capability expanded rapidly to capture nearly 10% of
the market by 1985.31 The failure of ITA members to attract new produ-
cers32 undermined their command of the world tin market.33
The problem of supply was exacerbated by the availability of cheap
substitutes for tin. Tin consumers believed that the price of tin was too
high relative to the price of alternative materials that performed the same
functions. Consequently, consumers began to purchase these substitutes.
Particularly in food packaging, plastics and aluminum have replaced
tin.34 Tin recycling also has increased.35 Tin competes directly with
these products, so its price must stay within the same range as the prices
of the substitutes. The availability of substitutes at comparable prices
means that the demand curve for tin is highly elastic. 36 Thus, if the price
of tin increases, demand for it falls because consumers have cheaper
alternatives.
The presence of an elastic demand curve made price control by an
ICA more difficult because consumers would turn to tin substitutes when
the price of tin increased by a small degree. Similarly, other ICAs have
lost power as product substitutes entered their markets. For example,
the International Sugar Agreement suffered from an excess supply of
sugar due to overproduction and the increase of sugar substitutes such as
corn syrup, saccharin, and aspartame. Additionally, the International
Natural Rubber Organization must compete with the falling prices of
synthetic rubber.37
Despite its problems of supply, the ITA's original design compen-
sated for some fluctuations in supply through the use of its buffer stock.38
The buffer stock manager purchased the "excess" tin-i.e., the amount
30 ITA 6, supra note 1, Annex A.
31 Brazil's production levels went from a 1982 figure of 8000 metric tons to 26,000 metric tons in
1985. Gilbert, supra note 11, at 612.
32 The Tin Cartel is Making a Scrap Heap of the Market, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 38.
33 A new cartel of tin producers called the Association of Tin Producing Countries formed in
1983. 23 I.L.M. 1009 (1984). This tin cartel succeeded in attracting Brazil to its membership. Bra-
zil will join tin group, Fin. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, at 32, col. 7.
34 Bleiberg, supra note 2, at 11; Wagstyl, supra note 2.
35 McFadden, supra note 1, at 824.
36 Id. at 816.
37 Wassermann, supra note 3, at 234.
38 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 28(3). The buffer stock managed the ITC tin stockpiles created by
the accumulation of members' required tin contributions. Id. Art. 22(2).
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over the supply desired by the ITC---on the market. The buffer stock
manager held the purchased tin on reserve. As a result, buffer stock
purchases reduced the supply, thereby causing an increase in tin prices.39
Ordinarily, the buffer stock manager could balance the buffer stock by
selling its accumulated tin holdings when the market price exceeded the
ITC price ceiling. In the early 1980s, however, nonmember tin produc-
tion increased the world supply of tin, thereby driving tin prices down."
The buffer stock manager had to purchase more tin stock than originally
planned to support tin.41 The price of tin never increased enough to al-
low the manager to sell off the buffer stock holdings. Eventually, the
cartel had to borrow money to finance the continued buffer stock
purchases.42 The value of the entire tin agreement hinged upon the
strength of the price and supply controls. When the money and the tin
stock supply was depleted, the agreement could no longer function.43
D. The Crisis
The ITC collapsed in late 1985 due to its outstanding debt.' ITC
creditors, including banks and brokers in tin futures on the London
Metal Exchange, have failed to recover the estimated £ 900,000,0004"
due on loan contracts and tin futures contracts. The ITC itself is bereft
of assets.46 The ITC members, all but one of whom are sovereign
states, 7 have denied responsibility for the debts.48
39 The ITC set floor and ceiling prices in order to meet the ITA 6's goal of a stable tin market.
The margin was divided into three equal sized sections. ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 27(1). When the
tin prices were at or above the ceiling price or at or below the floor price, the buffer stock manager
was required to sell or buy tin to force the price back into the acceptable range. Id. Art. 28(3)(a) &
(e). If the market price existed within the upper or lower sectors of the acceptable range, the buffer
stock manager had discretion to use the buffer stock to adjust prices. Id. Art. 28(3)(b) & (d). If the
market price was in the middle sector, the manager required authorization from a "two-thirds dis-
tributed majority of the Council." Id. Art. 28 (3)(c).
40 Caught In a Tin Box, supra note 23, at 114.
41 The ITC approved buffer stock trading at prices below the established floor. Tin Buffer Stock
May Trade Below Floor Price, Fin. Times, Mar. 29, 1985, at 36, Col. 4.
42 K. KHAN, supra note 17, at 171.
43 E. ATiMOMO, LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN COMMODITY ECONOMICS 152 (1982).
44 The ITC announced that it could no longer meet its financial obligations on October 24, 1985.
Bleiberg, supra note 2; Wagstyl, supra note 2.
45 Estimates of the debt range from £ 600,000,000 to £ 900,000,000. MacGlashan, The Interna-
tional Tin Council Should a Trading Organisation Enjoy Immunity?, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 193
(1987); see CHIMNI, supra note 24, at 198.
46 Breiberg, supra note 2, at 11; Wassermann, supra note 3, at 232-33.
47 The European Economic Community is the only member that is not a sovereign state.
48 The Tin Crisis Is Rattling the Metals Markets, Bus. WK., Nov. 25, 1985, at 38.
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III. MISMANAGEMENT BY THE ITC
There are numerous examples from the early 1980s of mismanage-
ment by the administrators of the ITC. While the court in Maclaine
Watson recognized this "gross mismanagement," its existence did not af-
fect the court's decision, which indirectly condoned this behavior.4 9 Ex-
amples of the mismanagement include unauthorized buffer stock
purchases and forward contracts for tin.
A. Buffer Stock-Unauthorized Borrowing
ITC members disavowed liability to third parties for unauthorized
borrowing by claiming that they could not be responsible for the ultra
vires acts of the ITC.50 Originally, the buffer stock purchases were lim-
ited to 50,000 metric tons. The limit was later modified to include buffer
stock holdings from the ITA 5, so that the new ITA 6 total limit was set
at 64,183 metric tons.5 The amount to be financed by borrowing, how-
ever, remained limited to 20,000 metric tons.5 2 Figures show that the
ITC exceeded its authority by borrowing funds for buffer stock purchases
beyond the 20,000 metric ton limit.5 3 All of the excess tin in the buffer
stock was financed by unauthorized borrowing.
Although the governing agreement did not provide for those funds,
the members' argument that the borrowing was ultra vires is weak be-
cause they composed the Council5 4 that approved the borrowing. 5 The
49 After the Court of Appeal's decision in Maclaine Watson, several ITC creditors sued the
member states on two grounds: negligent misprepresentation and fraudulent trading. Amalgamated
Metal Trading Ltd. v. Department of Trade & Industry, Fin. Times Law Reports, Feb. 28, 1989. On
the negligent misrepresentation charge, the court in Amalgamated recognized the commercial nature
of the loan and trading contracts between the ITC and its creditors. As a result, it held that the
transactions were not protected by the State Immunity Act, and the states were not immune from
liability on those transactions. The creditors, however, were still unsuccessful because as the court
noted, neither party to a commercial transaction owes a duty of care to the other. Without such a
duty, the claim of negligence could not be sustained. The fraudulent misrepresentation claim, based
on the allegation that the states had misrepresented their "means or intention to repay the debts,"
also failed. The member states relied on a defense in the 1828 Statute of Frauds that absolved states
from liability unless the "misrepresentation" was written and signed by the maker. The court held
that the contracts signed by the ITC could not meet that test. Hermann, 1677 Statute Protects DTI
from Liability for Tin Council Debts, Fin. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at 31, col. 5. This decision was
upheld by the House of Lords. Hughes, supra note 8.
50 CHIMNI, supra note 24, at 210-11.
51 Id. at 208.
52 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 21.
53 The ITC held over 60,000 metric tons, 10,000 metric tons more than permitted by the agree-
ment. Wassermann, supra note 3, at 232. This total included the amount held in forward contracts
as the ITA 6 required. CHIMNI, supra note 24, at 208.
54 "The Council shall be composed of all the members." ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 4(1). Each
member appointed a representative, an alternate and advisers to attend the meeting. Id. Art. 4(2).
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member states had sufficient control over their own representatives to
prevent such mismanagement. 6 The members had extensive knowledge
of ITC dealings because the ITC was required to publish quarterly re-
ports detailing the "tonnage of tin metal held in the buffer stock at the
end of that quarter,"5 7 yearly audit reports on the buffer stock,58 and
yearly financial reports on the ITC operations generally. 9 Armed with
these reports, the ITC representatives knew or should have known of the
developing problems and informed their governments.
B. Forward Contracts
Much of the ITC's unauthorized borrowing was used to purchase
tin futures. The ITC made generous use of tin forward contracts, which
were permitted by ITA 6,60 in its buffer stock operation.61 In a forward
contract, both the purchasing and selling parties speculate that the mar-
ket will move either up or down in a way that will benefit them. The ITC
purchased futures in tin hoping that the futures would increase in value
as the price of tin increased. Instead, the tin prices fell, and the ITC lost
money on the deals. Because many of these purchases were financed
with borrowed money,62 when the ITC defaulted on its loans, it was un-
able to pay for the unprofitable futures contracts it had already con-
tracted to purchase. The ITC, knowing that the market price of tin was
falling, should have known that there was always a possibility that it
would lose money on the contracts. Planning to pay for the future con-
tracts with borrowed money proved to be an unwise strategy because the
expected profits to fund the loans never materialized.63
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Aside from the issues of mismanagement, the ITC's creditors could
have made strong legal arguments based on members' implied liability
55 The ITC had to approve the terms and the conditions of all buffer stock borrowing. Id. Art.
24(l).
56 CHIMNI, supra note 24, at 210-11; but see D. POLLARD, LAW AND POLICY OF PRODUCERS'
ASSOCIATIONS 284 (1984) [hereinafter POLLARD].
57 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 7(g).
58 Id. Art. 19(2).
59 Id. Art. 7(f).
60 Futures contracts are purchases made through a broker for tin to be delivered in the future.
They were permitted in ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 28(5).
61 Gilbert, supra note 11, at 595.
62 Gilbert, supra note 11, at 595; Maidenburg, What the Tin Debacle Means For Futures Mar-
kets, 15 FUTURES 66 (1986) [hereinafter Maidenburg].
63 Although the ITC was overextended, one commentator directs some blame to the way brokers
on the London Metal Exchange sold futures contracts. Maidenburg, supra note 62, at 68.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 10:309(1989)
for buffer stock borrowing, immunity issues, the alternative liquidation
procedures of the administrative account, and the lack of an express
statement excluding liability. The Maclaine Watson court chose between
the application of English law and international law because the litiga-
tion involved English contracts made by an international body. The
court based its decision on English law because two of the three judges
believed that the English court had no authority to interpret an interna-
tional agreement based on international law.' 4 The court found there
was no liability under English law. The third judge, however, found that
international law could support ITC member liability.65
A. Members' Implied Liability for Buffer Stock Borrowing
All but the first ITA included some provision permitting the ITC to
borrow to finance the buffer stock if necessary.66 In those previous ITAs,
members' liability for buffer stock borrowing was implied. Prior to ITA
6, the ITC needed the unanimous consent of the producers and the ap-
proval of a majority of the consumers in order to borrow funds. Further-
more, consumer members were not required to contribute funds to the
buffer stock. The wording of the provisions for borrowing in the earlier
ITAs suggests that only those members confirming the need to borrow
were responsible for the debt. Consumers essentially were exempt. The
ITA 2 provision, for example, exempted consuming members from any
obligation incurred "in respect of such borrowing" whether or not they
approved of borrowing. 67 This sentence suggests that the exclusion ap-
plied only to consumers, leaving producers open for responsibility. Ac-
cording to ITA 3, a country that voted against borrowing funds would
not have any obligation respecting that borrowing "without the consent
of that country.",68 Again, this clause suggests that only the withholding
member was immune. Similarly, ITA 4 held that no consumer country
would have any "obligation for borrowing without consenting."
69
Although worded differently, each limitation implied that the producer
nations who unanimously supported borrowing, and the majority of con-
sumer nations who agreed, would be held responsible for the debt.
64 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 337.
65 Id. at 332-34.
66 ITA 1, supra note 16, made no mention of borrowing.
67 UNCTAD, Second International Tin Agreement, 1960, Art. 8 (b)(a), U.N. Doc. E/Conf.32/
5, U.N. Sales No. 61.II.D.2.
68 UNCTAD, Third International Tin Agreement, 1965, Art. 10(6)(a), U.N. Doc. TD/TIN.3/5,
U.N. Sales No. 65.II.D.2.
69 UNCTAD, Fourth International Tin Agreement, 1970, Art. 24(c), U.N. Doc. TD/TIN.4/7/
Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.70.II.D.10.
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The situation changed slightly with the ITA 6 because consumer
nations acquired voting power and financial duties equal to those of the
producers.70 Since all the members shared power and responsibility
equally, it is possible to infer from previous ITAs that the parties in-
tended to share the burden equally. The new agreement did not mention
whether consumers or producers were accountable for buffer stock re-
payment obligations.
B. Immunity
Immunity from legal process is inextricably tied to any discussion of
the liability of ICAs or of their sovereign state members because both
ICAs and sovereign states enjoy statutorily granted immunity in Eng-
land.7" In the Maclaine Watson case, however, legal immunity should
not be sufficient to shield either the ITC or the member states from liabil-
ity. Such a shield would prevent the operation of sufficient deterrents
against their misfeasance.
Although the states did not individually or collectively contract
with the creditors in their own name as sovereign entities, the issue of
state immunity-as opposed to ITC immunity-is still relevant. The
theory of concurrent or secondary liability which creditors presented in
Maclaine Watson suggested that both the ITC and its members would be
liable for the ITC's debts. The sovereign immunity issue is also signifi-
cant to two classes of plaintiffs: those plaintiffs who seek payment of
arbitration awards made against the ITC from the member states, and
those creditors who, because of omissions in their contracts, have no re-
course against the ITC itself.
The ITC and the states do not share identical immunities because
two different documents separately determine their immunity status.
Therefore, their distinct immunity defenses must be discussed separately.
L Immunity of the International Tin Council
The ITC's status was established in the United Kingdom by the
Headquarters Agreement, 72 an accord between the ITC and the British
government. The British Parliament granted 73 to the ITC certain immu-
70 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 14(2).
71 The International Tin Council (Privileges and Immunities) Order, S.I. 1972, No. 120 [herein-
after Order] governs the ITC's immunities, and the State Immunity Act, 1978 ch. 33 [hereinafter
State Immunity Act, 1978] governs the sovereign states' immunities.
72 Headquarters Agreement, London, Feb. 9, 1972; T.S. No. 38 (1972), Cmnd. 4938 [hereinafter
Headquarters Agreement].
73 The ITC enjoyed the same privileges and immunities granted by the British government to
several international organizations headquartered in England. English law specifies exactly what
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nities in the International Tin Council (Privileges and Immunities) Order
197271 (the "Order"). Although paragraph 6(1) of the Order granted the
ITC "immunity from suit and legal process,"' 75 this particular immunity
should not protect the ITC from suit because the ITC failed to include
arbitration clauses in all of its private contracts, as was required by the
British government under the Headquarters Agreement.76 Furthermore,
Article 24 of the Agreement provided that the ITC agreed to submit to
an "international arbitration tribunal" at the request of the British gov-
ernment in order to deal with problems arising from noncontractual obli-
gations or any damages caused by the ITC.7 According to the Order,
the ITC's immunity was to be suspended for the enforcement of arbitra-
tion judgments and awards anticipated to result from the clauses re-
quired by Articles 23 and 24.78 In fact, eleven creditors had obtained
arbitration clauses, completed arbitration proceedings, and won
awards-though unpaid-against the ITC.7 9
States generally do not grant immunity from jurisdiction unless they
expect external disputes to be handled in another forum."0 The provi-
sions in the Headquarters Agreement requiring submission to private ar-
privileges and immunities are to be accorded to an international organization. 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND para. 1597 (4th ed. 1977). Thirty-nine international organizations, including the ITC,
have the same privileges and immunities. Id. paras. 1598-99.
74 Order, supra note 71.
75 The Order also provided for three exceptions to the granted immunity. The ITC was not
immune from actions arising due to an express waiver made by the ITC in a particular case, a civil
suit resulting from an automobile accident, and the enforcement of an arbitration award "when
made under Article 23 or 24 of the Headquarters Agreement." Id. para. 6(l)(a), (b), (c). Standard
Chartered Bank acquired the last such waiver in their loan agreement with the ITC that said: "[Tihis
facility letter shall be governed by... English law and [the ITC] hereby irrevocably submit[s] to the
nonexclusive jurisdiction of the High Court... and consent[s] to... the issue of any process...
against [it]." The Court agreed that this was a waiver of immunity consistent with the form set forth
in the Order para. 6(1)(a) and agreed that recovery of the loan was permitted despite the ITC's
objections. Standard Chartered Bank v. International Tin Council, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 641, 642, [1986]
3 All E.R. 257, 258.
76 Article 23 of the Headquarters Agreement specifically required that arbitration clauses be
included in all contracts the ITC made with residents or corporations of the United Kingdom.
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 72, Art. 23.
77 These did not include disputes about the interpretation of the ITA, so this section is less
relevant to this discusssion. Id. Art. 24.
78 Order, supra note 71, para. 6(1)(c).
79 These creditors were suing the member states for payment because the ITC was unable to pay
the awards. The member countries, however, contest that argument. They claim that those credi-
tors who chose to include arbitration clauses in their contracts and won arbitration awards forfeited
their opportunity to pursue the member states for the same debts through litigation. Even if the
states were forced to pay, it may be impossible to collect. The main assets the countries have in
England are their assets in central banks which are immune under the State Immunity Act 1978.




bitration indicates that Britain, as the host country,81 and the ITC
members intended to solve disputes with third parties in an established
forum. The British government must have intended to restrict the ITC
immunity because it included the requirement in the document that gov-
erns the status, privileges and immunities of the ITC in England. The
grant of immunity hinged upon the satisfaction of this requirement. Al-
ternatively, the ITC's acquiescence to the clause might have operated as
an express waiver of immunity because it subjected the ITC to some body
that could impose a binding judgment.82 It is unlikely that the United
Kingdom intended to permit or that the ITC claimed that the ITC could
escape responsibility in its private contracts simply by omitting the
mandatory arbitration clause.
2. Immunity of the ITC Members
In England, the State Immunity Act of 1978 determines what ac-
tions taken by sovereign states are immune from legal process. Gener-
ally, sovereign actions of a commercial nature are exempt from
immunity.83 The State Immunity Act, therefore, is an inadequate shield
for the ITA member states because the types of obligations at issue in this
case-namely, loans and tin futures purchases-are unprotected by the
exemptions in the Act for two reasons.8 4
First, the State Immunity Act's statutory language specifies that
states are not immune from any contractual obligations that are to be
partially or completely performed in the United Kingdom. 5 In the
Maclaine Watson litigation, both types of obligations-the loans and the
purchases of tin futures-were contractual. Circumstances suggest that
those ITC contracts were at least partially performed in the United
Kingdom. The ITC was headquartered in London and transacted most
of its business there.86 Although not all of the lending banks were Eng-
81 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 16(4).
82 Order, supra note 71, para. 6(1)(a).
83 State Immunity Act, 1978, supra note 71, Art. (3)(1)(a).
Historically, the law of England held that sovereign states were always immune from legal
proceedings that could stem from any of their acts. For example, in 1919, the English Court of
Appeal held that a trading ship owned by a sovereign could not be held for its ordinary commercial
trading debts because the sovereign's immunity extended to cover his commercial activities. The
Porto Alexandre, I Lloyd's Rep. 191 (1919). After the passage of the immunity restrictions in the
State Immunity Act, such results were impossible.
84 The State Immunity Act, 1978, supra note 71, permits immunities when the actions of a
government, sovereign, or public official acting for the government relate to the "exercise of sover-
eign authority" or "the circumstances are such that a State... would have been so immune." Id.
Art. 14.
85 Id. Art. 3(l)(b).
86 Headquarters Agreement, supra note 72.
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lish, the loan transactions did take place in London. 7 Additionally, the
purchases of tin futures were made on the London Metal Exchange.88
Second, the Act, like its U.S. counterpart, 89 restricts states' immuni-
ties to those actions that are the purely governmental fulfillment of polit-
ical duties, or "actus imperii."9° Any sovereign's commercial act, or
"actus gestionis," would not be immune from legal proceedings. 91 How-
ever, the distinction between actus imperii and actus gestionis is not easily
made. Thus, the question of immunity remains unclear. The facts sur-
rounding the contracts convincingly indicate that the steps taken to oper-
ate the buffer stock, such as loans and futures contracts, were in fact
commercial. 92 The lending institutions were all private banks that made
business loans to private clients. Trading activity on the London Metal
Exchange can be classified as purely commercial since private individuals
and institutions do speculate in all of the metals markets. Perhaps the
only distinction that can be made is in the size of the transactions. The
ITC did borrow and buy in large amounts. The actual nature of the act,
however, should not be affected by the size of the transaction.
The courts of England and other countries have held that the motive
behind an act does not determine its commercial nature. 93 In a recent
House of Lords case, a Cuban state enterprise was sued for breach of
contract for failure to deliver a cargo of sugar.94 The Cuban government
had prevented the ships from docking at their Chilean port of delivery
because a 1973 coup in Chile had caused an immediate suspension of
Cuban-Chilean diplomatic relations. The important question was
whether the recall of the ship was a commercial act or an immune polit-
ical act. The House of Lords, England's highest judicial body, held that
87 Bankers Beware, FORBES, Apr. 27, 1987, at 63.
88 Cooke, The Tin Crisis is Rattling The Metals Markets, Bus. WK, Nov. 25, 1985, at 38; Bar-
tholomew, Slow Track Planning, FAR EAST. EcoN. REv., Jan. 23, 1986, at 67.
89 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602
(1989). The Tate Letter, an advisory opinion from a State Department advisor, stated that the
United States would make the distinction between jure gestionis and jure imperil. 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984, 985 (1952).
90 These acts are described as "imperii." State Immunity Act, 1978, supra note 71, Art. 3(3)(c).
91 Id. Art. 3(1). See also C. LEwis, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 14 (1985).
92 Another commentator has suggested a different method to distinguish a state's commercial
acts from its public acts. Badr suggested that any agreement negotiated between a state and a pri-
vate entity on "equal footing" that is to have effect outside the state's jurisdiction and enforcement
power indicates that the agreement is commercial. G. BADR, STATE IMMUNITY: AN ANALYTICAL
AND PROGNOSTIC VIEW 65-70 (1984) [hereinafter BADRI.
93 In The 'I Congresso del Partido, " the English Court of Appeal referred to the decisions of
Austrian, Belgian, Greek, and German courts which had come to the same conclusion. The "I
Congresso del Partido," [C.A.] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 33, 34 (1980).
94 The court noted that in Cuba, commercial activities were handled by semi-independent state
enterprises, not private companies.
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the Cuban government was not immune because the contract was a com-
mercial obligation breached by the Cuban government. The ordered
withdrawal of the ships, though perhaps politically inspired, still resulted
in a contractual breach. The government did not exercise any of its sov-
ereign powers in preventing the ship from fulfilling its contractual duties.
Any private trading company could have recalled its ship and been liable
for breach. The court explained that "[i]f immunity were to be granted
the moment that any decision taken by the trading state were to be
shown to be not commerci ally, but politically, inspired, the restrictive
theory [of immunity] would almost cease to have any content."9 5 An act
that is purely commercial done for purely political reasons is still consid-
ered to be a commercial act for purposes of restrictive immunity.96 It
follows that loans and tin futures obligations that are commercial in na-
ture should not be immune simply because member states claim political
motivations.
Although its stated goals were not explicit,97 the ITC was motivated
by profit. The law does not require proof of a commercial motive, but it
is apparent that the ITC had one.98 The states, relying on the stated
purposes in ITA 6, might argue that they were motivated by political
concerns for an adequate world tin supply and the growth of "developing
producing countries."9 9 Individually, however, each tin producing coun-
try was motivated by its own increased earnings. The purpose of the
cartel was to maintain a high price to satisfy producers.10 Some analysts
95 The "I Congresso del Partido," [H.L.] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 367, 376-77 (1981).
96 U.S. courts have issued similar rulings. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a ship charter, ordered by a department of the Government of Spain, to transport wheat to
Spain is a commercial act. Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 360-61 (2d Cir. 1964).
See also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1975). The assets of
five Cuban cigar manufacturers were nationalized by the Cuban government. The government ap-
pointed administrators (interventors) who accepted payment from an importer (Dunhill) for goods
sent by the original owners. The payments were owed to the previous owners. The interventors
refused to return the money to the importers who were still legally bound to pay the previous own-
ers. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Cuban government was not immune because the debt
owed was commercial no matter what the justification for the original expropriation of the manufac-
turers' assetS.
97 However, the purposes do refer to increasing "export earnings" and fostering the growth of
the industry. ITA 6, supra note 1, Preamble (a) & (d).
98 Through the end of each agreement up through ITA 4, a surplus of funds in the buffer stock
account was available for distribution to contributing members. KHAN, supra note 17, at 359.
99 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 1(c).
100 However, the council determines the tin price together. The consumers and the producers
share an equal number of votes, so it is unlikely that the consuming nations would support an
extremely high price. But see Caught in a Tin Box, supra note 23, at 115; McFadden, supra note 1,
at 819 (reports that consumer nations were also critical of the high prices).
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believed that the high price was above the "natural" market price.'
For Malaysia, a major tin producer and an ITA 6 member, "tin was one
of the pillars" of its economy.102 Malaysia is heavily dependent upon its
tin industry because it creates domestic employment and is a source of
foreign exchange.103 Without the promise of a profit, member countries
such as Malaysia would not have remained cartel members.1o4
The passage of the State Immunity Act could have a major impact
on the liabilities of member states because of the commercial activities in
which they were involved through the ITC. No liability limitation had
existed in the earlier agreements, but during that earlier period, immu-
nity was absolute.0 5 The ITA 6 was the first tin agreement enacted after
the passage of the State Immunity Act.'0 6 In fact, since the members
enacted ITA 6 four years after the statutory restriction on immunity im-
posed by the State Immunity Act, it is odd that they neglected to address
the immunity issue at all. Other changes were made in the document, so
the ITC had an opportunity to resolve that issue.'0 7 The drafters' failure
to respond to the change in England's law might be explained by the
members' belief that the stated ITA 6 political motives would confer
political immunity upon their commercial acts.
C. Liquidation Procedure
The ITC administered two separate financial accounts authorized by
the ITA 6. The first, the buffer stock account, dealt with the finances of
the buffer stock operation. A second administrative account, which han-
dled the ITC's operating costs, was financed from required member con-
tributions and borrowed money. In the event of dissolution of the ITA 6,
the agreement provided for the liquidation of the two financial ac-
counts.'018 The liquidation, however, was structured differently for each
account. If a deficit existed in the administrative account, the ITA 6
required members to supply enough funds to satisfy the full amount of
debt incurred in that year.109 On the other hand, members were not
obliged to satisfy buffer stock debts. Deficits in that account were to be
101 The Tin Cartel is Making a Scrap Heap of the Market, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985 at 38.
102 Wassermann, supra note 3, at 232.
103 Bartholomew, Free Market Revival, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Nov. 13, 1986, at 110.
104 One year after the collapse, Malaysia had closed 275 of its 500 tin mines. Id.
105 See BADR, supra note 92.
106 The ITA 5 lasted until 1982, when the ITA 6 began. McFadden, supra note 1, at 819-21.
107 Other changes made in ITA 6 included a modification in the export control system, equal
sharing of financial responsibility between consumers and producers, and alterations in the adminis-
tration of the buffer stock. Introduction to ITA 6, supra note 1, paras. 17, 20, 26.
108 Id. Art. 26.
109 Id. Art. 20(2).
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paid from profits of buffer stock sales.110 This plan failed because banks
held all of the tin stock as collateral for loans. The ITA 6 did not estab-
lish any alternate plan of buffer stock debt financing.
The distinction in liquidation procedure might be explained by the
comparatively smaller debt the administrative account could have accu-
mulated.111 Furthermore, the ITC specifically had agreed to relinquish
immunity in employee matters because the British government wanted to
protect people in employment situations from working for an employer
immune from suit. For that reason, the State Immunity Act specifies
that "[a] State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a con-
tract of employment between the state and the individual" where the
contract is made and to be performed in the United Kingdom.1 12
Although the ITC was not a "state," perhaps it was aware of the United
Kingdom's desire to protect individuals in employment situations.
Again, the value of these employment contractual obligations was proba-
bly smaller than any buffer stock commitments, so the members were
probably indifferent to minimal required contributions for unpaid
salaries.
D. Lack of Express Statement
The ITA 6 does not contain any express provisions barring or limit-
ing members' liability to third-party creditors for buffer stock borrow-
ing.113 This absence is notable because sixteen of the sixty-four
international organizations of which England is a member have included
some statement in their charter limiting their liability for debt." 4 For
example, both the Common Fund for Commodities and the International
Institute for Cotton repudiated the idea of liability based on membership
in the organization.115 Another four organizations, including two com-
modity organizations, specifically stated that members were not liable for
the organization's borrowing.' 16 Some organizations also included warn-
ings to "persons dealing with the international organisation" that the
110 Id. Art. 26(3).
111 The administrative account included office costs and salaries. Id. Art. 17(b).
112 State Immunity Act, 1978, supra note 71, § 4(1).
113 The ITAs had never included such express language. Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at
276.
114 Id. at 321-22.
115 Id. at 354.
116 These four organizations are: the International Sugar Organisation, U.N. Doc. TD/Sugar. 10/
1 l/Rev.1, Art.42(2) (1984); the International Cocoa Agreement 1975, U.N. Pub. TD/COCOA.4.10,
Art. 37(5); the U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121, Art. 172(4)
(1982); and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1956), Art. XIV (g).
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members were not liable for debts.117 Such express language can be as-
sessed by any lending institution or creditor as part of its risk analysis
and credit check. Without this language, the creditor would have diffi-
culty in assessing the risk involved in a transaction.
The inclusion of such a clause in the agreement of the International
Natural Rubber Organisation may be distinguished from the absence of
such a clause in the ITA 6 because the International Rubber Organisa-
tion inserted that language only after knowledge of the ITC's difficulties
became public.11 However, the language in the International Sugar
Agreement, the International Cocoa Agreement, the U.N. Convention of
the Law of the Sea, and the International Atomic Energy Agency pre-
dated the 1985 tin crisis.' 19 These early amendments make it evident
that considerable doubt about members' liability was fueled by the State
Immunity Act.
In any loan, there is always a possibility that a borrower will be
unable to repay its debt. That risk of default, combined with an in-
creased possibility of liability, suggests that the ITA 6 drafters could
have perceived that the immunity issue needed to be addressed.120
Although the ITC had ample opportunity to amend the later versions of
the ITA, 2 1 and other international organization had made such changes
in their agreements, the court refused to infer that the absence of a state-
ment indicated that the members "tacitly assumed some obligation to
deal with [the buffer stock debts] if it should arise."' 22
E. Choice of Law
No coherent body of law has developed to resolve disputes concern-
ing international organizations. The Maclaine Watson court struggled to
resolve the question of the ITC's limited liability under both the English
legal system and the international legal system. The justices ultimately
decided that international law controlled.
117 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 276.
118 International Natural Rubber Organization 1987. Id. at 306.
119 See supra note 116.
120 One interpretation is that the members agreed to undertake compliance with the ITC's obliga-
tions under ITA 5, Art. 41(6). KHAN, supra note 17, at 365. However, that section does not elabo-
rate on the methods the members are to use to undertake those obligations. Khan assumes,
conceivably relying on the absence of contrary language, that the amount borrowed is charged to the
buffer stock account but is a charge on the members. Id. at 171.
121 The ITAs were revised every five years. Id. at 189-94.
122 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 304.
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L Limited Liability Under English Law
If English law applied,123 the ITC's members could be liable for the
ITC's debts. Although Parliament granted the ITC the "legal capacities
of a body corporate," 124 the ITC was not a corporation, and it did not
enjoy the limited liability of a corporation. 125 Member states had hoped
that recognition of the ITC as a true corporation would shield them from
liability as "shareholders" of the ITC. English law does provide a
method of creating true corporate bodies by an Act of Parliament.1 26
Three other international organizations, all from the European Eco-
nomic Community, have been incorporated by treaty. 127 They are Eng-
lish corporations with all of the ordinary powers. Unlike those
organizations, however, the ITC was never incorporated.
Corporations are distinct from bodies with corporate status. The
English Parliament has granted the status of "body corporate" to a total
of forty-three international organizations. 128 Corporate status mean that
the organization has the right to hold property, to make contracts, and to
institute legal proceedings.129 Limited liability is not included. Of those
forty-three organizations, thirty-nine-including the ITC-secured cer-
tain privileges and immunities distinguishable from those enjoyed by cor-
porations.1 30 While corporations have the power to sue and be sued,13 1
the specially granted immunities protect the organizations from legal
process. These thirty-nine organizations, unlike corporate bodies, cannot
be sued. 132 Thus, having corporate status is not equivalent to being a
corporation.
Evidence from early in the ITC's history suggests that the body con-
sidered itself to be subject to English law. The International Tin Agree-
ment's predecessor, the International Tin Committee (1934), obtained
several legal opinions to determine what legal status would best satisfy its
123 The Maclaine Watson court believed that the ITC could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
English courts. Id. at 303.
124 The ITC has the capacity to hold property, to make contracts, and to initiate legal proceed-
ings. ITA, supra note 1, Art. 16(1).
125 English corporate law provides that creditors' rights are "limited to the wealth of that com-
pany alone" and do not extend to the assets of shareholders. R. TRICKER, CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE 151 (1984).
126 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1247 (4th ed. 1974).
127 Id. para. 1327.
128 Id. paras. 1598-99.
129 ITA 6, supra note 1, Art. 16(1).
130 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 1598-99 (4th ed. 1974).
131 A corporate body can be sued. 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1382 (4th ed. 1974).
132 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND paras. 1597-99 (4th ed. 1974).
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needs. One opinion letter recommended incorporation because without
it:
[T]he members of the [Buffer Stock] Committee would personally have to
act as buyers and sellers of tin, which would involve them individually in
personal liabilities; and (in the event of any liquidation resulting from liabil-
ity to creditors) the members of the committee would personally have to be
either plaintiffs or defendants as the case may be. We should therefore ad-
vise that a private company should be registered ... and that all transac-
tions in tin should be effected by and in the name of the company, which
will be a corporate body capable of suing and being sued.1 33
The Committee rejected this legal advice, perhaps because it deter-
mined that the risk of liability was insignificant. Alternatively, it is possi-
ble that the members avoided incorporating under English law for fear
that English incorporation would constitute the ITC's submission to
English jurisdiction.1 34 If the ITC were subject to English corporate law,
the members who administered the agreement might be personally re-
sponsible as officers and directors for ITC actions that were beyond the
scope of the ITC's powers, such as the unauthorized buffer stock
purchases. 135
At one point, the Court of Appeal's opinion hinted that members of
the ITC could be held liable for its debts despite the existence of sover-
eign states' immunity. That comment implied that the members might
be commercial actors and subject to English law. However, such a belief
is not reasonable since the ITC has been recognized as an international
body with immunitites. None of the governing documents states that the
ITC is subject to English law. In fact, the grant of special immunities
that explicitly protected it from suit and legal process indicates that the
ITC was deliberately immunized from English law. English law cannot
control.
2. Limited Liability Under International Law
The justices agreed that the ITC, as a supra-national organiza-
tion, 136 was not subject to the laws of any particular nation.'37 Instead,
the ITC was governed by international law.'38 However, because inter-
national law governing limited liability for international organizations is
133 Letter to the Secretary of the International Tin Committee (July 24, 1934), reprinted in
KHAN, supra note 17, at 164-65.
134 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 348.
135 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 1344 (4th Ed. 1974).
136 A supra-national organization is composed of states that are subject to international law.
POLLARD, supra note 56, at 286-87.
137 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 229.
138 "In the absence of appropriate machinery for the incorporation of bodies in international law,
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unclear, the Maclaine Watson court struggled to resolve the issue. The
fact that the ITC possessed English corporate powers did not alter its
international nature. 3 9 However, in the absence of an international leg-
islature to formulate laws accepted by all countries, the court found that
no consensus on limited liability existed. The law that does exist is
geared toward resolving conflicts between sovereign states, not conflicts
between international organizations and private parties. 4° Additionally,
no international enforcement apparatus is available to ensure that inter-
national organizations satisfy dispute settlements." 1
The justices on the Maclaine Watson court disagreed about the in-
ternational rule of law with regard to limited liability for international
organizations. Two justices held that no international law required that
the members of international organizations expressly limit their liability.
Without a positive requirement, the justices held that the absence of an
express limitation could not be understood as an admission of liability. 142
On the other hand, the dissenting justice believed that when the rule of
international law is unclear, the presiding court can study the works of
legal scholars, current international treaties and conventions, and local
legislation and judicial decisions to determine what the international rule
of law would be.1 43 After making the survey, the dissenting justice con-
cluded that members of international organizations are liable for debts of
the organizations unless they specifically limit their liability.1" Because
the ITC members did not expressly limit their liability for ITC debts, the
justice found that they intended to be liable. ' Although the majority
found no liability, the uncertainty in this area makes contracting with
international organizations hazardous for private parties. Because the
House of Lords confirmed the Court of Appeal's decision in this case, it
appears that a solution could arise only from diplomatic efforts because
"an international solution must be found to an international problem."1 46
the existence of such a legal personality results from the recognition of them as such by other sub-
jects .... POLLARD, supra note 56, at 99.
139 The "conferment of municipal legal personality on such institutions would not appear to be of
vital juridical significance in determining their status in international law." Id. at 98.
140 Id. at 286-87.
141 The absence of a legal system is accompanied by the absence of a judicial one. "By and large
... international organizations have no supreme court capable of adjudicating constitutional dis-
putes." BowETr, supra note 80, at 363.
142 Maclaine Watson, [1988] 3 All E.R. at 306.
143 Id. at 324.
144 Id. at 330.
145 Id. at 333.
146 Hughes, supra note 8.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. ICAs-A Lack of Focus
International commodities organizations face a fundamental di-
lemma because members are motivated by a "multiplicity of objec-
tives." 47 Economic goals of higher prices, increased consumption, and
larger markets must compete with political goals such as increased do-
mestic employment and fair labor standards that promote domestic sta-
bility and economic growth in developing countries. If the political goals
are desirable, members should reach a consensus on how to achieve
them. If economic subsidies are necessary, the states themselves should
find a source of funding. Private creditors of ICAs should not find them-
selves as the unwilling subsidizers of various national programs. In the
tin case, the banks and brokers were left with debts totalling nearly £
900,000,000. That money was borrowed in order to support the econo-
mies of the producing countries. Because the courts so far have deter-
mined that the countries have no obligation to repay their debt, the
creditors are in effect subsidizing the countries. The bankers' unwilling-
ness to risk such a position could create a profound distrust of such
supra-national organizations among private creditors.
B. Creditors' Reactions
Bankers accustomed to doing business with supra-national organiza-
tions such as the ITC will probably be more wary when choosing their
clients and drafting their documents. 148 Any loan request from an inter-
national organization or even a government will evoke the memory of the
ITC default. 149 It is likely that credit markets for supra-national organi-
zations will shrink. Additionally, even brokers suspect that the tin his-
tory may affect future trading on other commodities.1 50
147 MacBean, supra note 13, at 583.
148 Morris, Bankers Beware, FORBES, Apr. 27, 1987, at 63 [hereinafter Morris]; Stoakes, Put Not
Your Trust in Princes, EUROMONEY, May 1986, at 269; [hereinafter Stoakes].
149 Morris, supra note 148, at 63.
150 Transatlantic Victims of Tin's Collapse, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 1987, at 78; see also Stockpile of
Illwill, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Dec. 24, 1987, at 67; Stoakes, supra note 148, at 269.
Banks involved in the ITC crisis have accepted a new responsibility. Since actual tin stocks
were the collateral for so many of the defaulted loans, many bankers have had to accept the tin stock
in lieu of payments. Since they have no metal trading experience, they have had to learn how the
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Although the courts and public opinion seem to support the moral
position of the ITC creditors,"' some people question the extent to
which the bankers and brokers bargained for the risk of lending to and
contracting with the ITC. One commentator, noting that the ITC loans
and forward contracts generated large profits, suggested that lenders anx-
ious for the profits were deliberately less critical of the ITC's risk. 52
The creditors, however, did have opportunities to evaluate the risk
of their contracts with the ITC. The Order in Council and the Head-
quarters Agreement, which stated the ITC's immunities and the arbitra-
tion clause requirement, are public documents. Creditors could have
examined them and discovered the exact nature of the risk they were
assuming.5 Furthermore, in none of the contracts between the ITC and
the banks or the brokers were the member countries mentioned. 5 4 Even
if the contracting parties had thought that the states were willing to fi-
nance the ITC's debts, no such intent was expressed in the contracts or in
ITA 6.15 Finally, the Bank of England unofficially had warned the bro-
kers on the London Metal Exchange that they should not rely on the
government members of the ITC to assume its debts. 15 6 Considering all
of these factors, the banks should not have been surprised when the ITC
defaulted and the member countries resisted liability.
The result in Maclaine Watson does not establish a strong, fair
framework for future cases involving international organizations. With
the ever-increasing role of state trading organizations in world trade-
especially in communist and developing nations-it is essential to have
established legal rules. If liability does not deter international organiza-
tions, undesirable and irresponsible behavior by the administrators of
these agreements may go unchecked. Even the Court of Appeal in
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Maclaine Watson, having found the member states free from liability,
acknowledged that an "inference of gross mismanagement" can be made
from the facts of the case.157 The ITC's representatives, knowing that
they faced no individual liability,' 58 may not have been risk-averse with
the funds they had borrowed. Under the Maclaine Watson decision,
member states have no incentive to properly administer any ICA to
which they belong. If current international law permits the ITC to omit
the arbitration clauses without penalty and to escape liability for the mis-
management of the buffer stock, some significant changes must be de-
vised. This Comment has shown that members' liability was a possible
and desirable alternative to the court's decision.
The Court of Appeal's decision, which was upheld in the House of
Lords,' 59 will change the way banks, brokers, and other private parties
contract with international organizations. Obtaining state waivers of im-
munity to establish liability between the original members and institu-
tions will become essential measures to avoid similar crises.
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